The teleological argument seeks to establish the existence of God, based on our perception of teleology—purposes or ends—in the natural world. One form of the teleological argument is the “clockwatch argument.” If you live on a remote island, far away from any modern technology, and walking along the beach discover a clockwatch, you might reasonably presume that it was created by some intelligent being. For it seems to have no reason for its existence—in all its complexity—except for some purpose given it by one who has created it. But the natural world itself, like the clockwatch, seems to bear many signs of having purposes built into it. This suggests an intelligent creator; which leads us, again, to God.
Like the other arguments, the teleological argument comes in a number of forms. The following argument from teleology looks toward modern physics for indications of design—specifically, the physics of the beginning of the universe. The benefit of looking for design in physics (as opposed to looking for it in biology) is that we can effectively sidestep the otherwise contentious debate surrounding evolution. We want to focus on physics over evolution because all evolution depends on a special kind of a universe; a universe, as we shall soon see, that is precisely “dialed in” for the very possibility of intelligent life. And if it happens to be the case that design is the only plausible explanation for this so-called “fine-tuning” of physics, it follows that behind such design is an intelligent designer—namely, God.
The Argument from Fine-Tuning
So, let’s get started. Modern astrophysics has revealed something startling about physical reality. Specifically, that certain parameters at the beginning of the universe appear to be fixed in just the way they would need to be for the emergence of intelligent, interactive life. These finely-tuned constants and quantities—such as the initial inputs of entropy (unusable energy), the strength of the strong nuclear force, etc.—have become known as “anthropic coincidences” since the probabilities against them being precisely what they are have become increasingly difficult to explain; that is, without the idea that an intelligent being designed them.[1]
Anthropic Coincidences: Three Examples
Entropy: Physicist Roger Penrose says this about the initial conditions of low-entropy (that is: of useable energy) at the beginning of our universe: “In order to produce a universe resembling the one in which we live, the Creator would have to aim for an absurdly tiny volume of the phase space of possible universes—about 1/10^10^123 [one part in ten, to the power of ten, to the power of 123] of the entire volume, for the situation under consideration.”[2]
Gravitational Constant: Conservative estimates hold that if the force of gravity varied by any more than one part in 10^50 [to the power of 50]++++++++++++++++, the universe would have either immediately collapsed back upon itself, or exploded throughout its expansion—either way, making the emergence of life impossible.[3]
Expansion Rate: if the cosmological constant (which determines the expansion rate of the universe) varied by anymore than one part in 10^120 [ten to the power of 120], the universe would have (again) either expanded too rapidly or too slowly for anything interesting to happen, including—and especially—the emergence of organic, intelligent life.[4]
The sheer, utter precision of this fine-tuning—and the probabilities of these constants and quantities being what they are, versus the range of what they could possibly be—is too enormous to be reasonably attributed to chance. Normal chance events assume the intersection of some previous, intelligible state of affairs. Fine-tuning, however, occurs right at the very beginning of the physical universe, so chance just isn’t a live explanatory option.
This Little Universe is Just Right
Furthermore, there is nothing “necessary” about these initial inputs and quantities. Ultimately, there is an enormous range of potential variance. And yet, they just so happen to be precisely what they are. We truly are in a “Goldilocks universe”: our universe is “just right” for life.
These anthropic coincidences, moreover, are so startling in their improbability, they’re what caused the formerly atheist physicist Fred Hoyle to admit the following: “A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion beyond question.”[5]
In other words, the best (and arguably only plausible) explanation for the discovery of fine-tuning is what religious people have believed all along: the existence of a “fine-tuner.” Specifically, the existence of a transcendent, intelligent, ordering mind. Namely, God.
An Alternate Version of the Teleological Argument
Here is another version of the argument. Throughout nature we experience a strong sense of directedness or purpose in things—specifically, of things being “aimed” at some particular effect or range of effects, simply in virtue of being the sort of thing that they are. For example, something simple, such as electrons being “by their very nature” attracted to protons. Or, something a bit more complicated, such as the aim (or function, we might call it) of human reason being “pointed at” or “inclined toward” the discernment of truth.
Now, notice what happens if we attempt to deny this. For example: to say human reason isn’t objectively aimed at truth is to immediately lose all ground for assessing whether somebody is reasoning well, or not. Unless reason is really and truly “for” the discernment of truth, we can’t say whether somebody gave a better or worse argument, since we need to assume there is some objective end (or possibly ends) from which to base an assessment of someone’s reasoning ability. In other words, to deny this fact of human reason—specifically, to provide an argument against teleology—is to deny that any arguments can effectively be given, including the argument against teleology itself. The position is self-defeating. Therefore, teleology—also known as “final causality”—is an undeniable fact of existence. Things (specifically, agents which exhibit causal regularities) really are “aimed at” certain effects, or ranges of effects.
But here’s the conundrum. Teleology is built in from the start. The various things of nature—whether electrons, water, or human reason—don’t select their natural teleology; in other words, they don’t actively “choose” what effects they produce (or toward which effects they naturally attain or at least strive to attain). This is very noticeably the case with unconscious substances, such as particles or acorns. But neither do humans, who are conscious, “choose” or “decide” (for example) that reason is pointed at discerning truth. That is just the inherent “inclination” or “telos” of reason itself. The nature of reason is “by its very nature” (and therefore, essentially) pointed at truth, whether we want it to be or not, and whether we like it or not.
So, what explains this? Let’s examine this question.
As mentioned, teleology is just another term for final causality. For example, an oak tree is the “final cause” of an acorn, in as much as an acorn (by its very nature) is “pointed at” or “directed toward” becoming an oak tree. But here’s the rub. Nothing can cause something unless that something already exists. But surely the oak tree does not exist in physical reality previous to the acorn—and yet, there is clear final causality (read: teleology) in the acorn toward the production of an oak tree. This is stable, regular, and normal—it is, in point of fact, part of what it means to be an acorn. So, how can we then speak intelligibly of an oak tree being a true “final cause” of the acorn if the oak tree does not yet physically exist? The only plausible option—and in fact, the seemingly correct option—is for such a final cause to exist in a way similar to the blueprint of a house—specifically, by existing in the mind of an intelligent, ordering cause—prior to the creation of any physical, natural thing.
Therefore, to explain the teleology in nature there must be a primary and intelligent first cause which can comprehensively grasp the relations between agents and their ends. There must also be interrelations between all existing, natural things, since in a universe such as ours the parts can only be truly understood and made sense of in relation to the whole. Moreover for that to be explained, the power of ideas is required. In other words, there exists a transcendent and intelligent mind behind the order and intelligibility of the physical cosmos. And that we call God.
Example Dialogue
Now that we’ve heard the argument, let’s see what it might look like in a real-life conversation.
Evangelist stands near a street corner with rosaries in hand. He smiles and says hello to passerby.
Evangelist [E]: Would you like a rosary?
Passerby [P]: [Passerby stops but doesn’t take the rosary] Thanks, but I’m an atheist and don’t really pray.
E: An atheist? There seems like there could be a few different meanings of that word [E gestures towards P with an open palm]. I’d be curious to hear how you’d define it.
P: Pretty simple. I just don’t believe the universe was created by any one all-mighty, all-powerful Flying Spaghetti Monster in the Sky.
E: [chuckling] Well, I can agree with you that I don’t think there’s a Flying Spaghetti Monster out there. What is it, though, about the universe that you think couldn’t be created by a Supreme Being?
P: It just doesn’t really make sense to me. Science, physics, evolution. Those make sense. That a god made everything seems to rely too much on wishful thinking.
E: I certainly appreciate your respect for science, and reason. As a Catholic, I believe deeply in the compatibility of faith and reason. Speaking of, could I give you one good reason that I believe in God? It’s actually a scientific reason, and I think you might find it interesting.
P: Sure, take your best shot.
E: Great. Have you ever heard of “anthropic coincidences?”
P: I’m not sure that I have…
E: Well, it’s a fairly recent discovery in modern astrophysics. Anyway, what cosmologists have discovered in the past 20 to 30 years is how the universe appears to be “fine-tuned” for the emergence of intelligent interactive life. In other words, right at the very beginning of the Big Bang there were certain “parameters” that were set that would make the conditions for life “just right.” Hence the name “anthropic coincidences,” since the probabilities against these parameters being just the way they are makes it seem like our universe was intelligently designed. These fine-tuning discoveries, in other words, have led many physicists to believe in a fine-tuner—namely, God!
P: OK, but you’ll have to give me an example of what you mean by “fine-tuning.”
E: Sure thing. One example would be the cosmological constant, which governs the expansion rate of the universe. Conservative estimates have it that if the cosmological constant were altered by just one part in 10^50 [10 to the power of 50], the universe would have either expanded too quickly for stars—and therefore chemistry—to form, or would have immediately collapsed back into itself. Either way, the consequences would have prevented the emergence of life. But that’s just one example. There are plenty of others. Would you like to hear more?
P: Sure, give me one more.
E: Here’s one that I find especially fascinating: The initial conditions of entropy, or usable energy right at the beginning of the universe. Famed physicist Roger Penrose once ran the calculations on the odds of our universe having an initial high amount of organized, useable energy He concluded that “In order to produce a universe resembling the one in which we live, the Creator would have to aim for an absurdly tiny volume of the phase space of possible universes—about 1/10^10^123 [one part in ten, to the power of ten, to the power of 123] of the entire volume, for the situation under consideration.” That’s a DOUBLE exponent! How crazy is that?
P: Admittedly, those are some pretty big numbers, who’s to say it couldn’t have happened by chance?
E: Well, I think there are a couple good reasons why chance isn’t the best explanatory option. The first is the sheer implausibility of it. I mean, the odds of some of these fine-tuning parameters being what they are is more improbable than a monkey typing the entire corpus of Shakespeare—without a single mistake—in one try! Nobody would sincerely believe such an enormously improbable thing could happen by accident with respect to a typing monkey. Why, then, should we suddenly assume we could be so lucky with respect to the universe? The second reason is that chance always assumes some previous convergence of non-chance events. For example, even with the typing monkey, we first have a monkey with certain abilities (however limited), and somebody who set that monkey with a typewriter, so there’s a possibility (however odd) of some unusual convergence, based on pre-existing, non-chance phenomena. So, in that sense, there’s a “chance”—however enormously improbable—that the monkey COULD type the entire corpus of Shakespeare. But the problem of fine-tuning is different, because fine-tuning occurs right at the very beginning of the universe. There are no pre-existing, physical events upon which “chance” could even occur. Does that make sense?
P: I suppose, but don’t some scientists believe in a multiverse? Wouldn’t that make chance a possibility?
E: From what I understand, the multiverse is so highly speculative that many scientists consider the theory to be quite unscientific, since even if the multiverse existed we’d never be able to observe it. Besides, if we’re going to follow Occam’s Razor in not posting explanations beyond necessity, there seems to be no good reason to posit a multiverse to explain fine-tuning than a much simpler, intelligent designer. But even with that said, in order to be theoretically possible, all multiverse scenarios themselves require immense amounts of fine-tuning, so the multiverse wouldn’t really explain fine-tuning, after all; it would only kick the problem up a stage. So, in other words, the argument would simply re-assert itself, and we’d again be left asking: What— or perhaps more specifically, who—is responsible for the fine-tuning? And it just seems to me the best and simplest answer is an intelligent fine-tuner.
P: I’ll admit this has been an interesting conversation, and has given me something to think about. But I still have an issue with religion and evolution—those seem entirely incompatible. Doesn’t the Bible say the earth is only, like, 6,000 years old?
E: This seems to be a sticking point for a lot of people, so just one quick point about evolution. If fine-tuning provides strong evidence of a cosmic designer, then God clearly set the parameters for evolution to take place—in fact, it would seem He intended for evolution to take place. Now, whether He more directly intervened along the way is another question, but what’s fascinating about these discoveries in modern astrophysics is that God could very well have “front-loaded” his design project, since evolution requires a very special, “finely-tuned” universe even to occur. So, I really don’t think evolution should be a legitimate hold up; at least not to believe in God.
Now, regarding your point about the Bible, here’s what I’d say about that: the interpretation of the book of Genesis and the creation story has been discussed and debated throughout the history of Christianity, and literalist readings of Genesis are a somewhat modern invention. The Catholic Church, for example, teaches that the early chapters of Genesis use figurative language, and St. Augustine—who lived some 1500 years before Darwin—read Genesis as more of a spiritual, hierarchical ordering of reality, rather than a temporal and/or scientific one.
All I’m saying is that a Christian is by no means committed to a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible as a whole, and, in fact, many prominent Christian theologians would reject a fundamentalist interpretation for reasons that are entirely theological, rather than scientific. Anyway, I’m babbling. What do you think of all this?
P: I don’t know yet… I’d have to study more.
E: I’ve got lots of great reading material on this subject. Would you be interested in taking some with you?
P: Sure, why not. I suppose it can never hurt to hear out the different perspectives.
E: Again, let me reaffirm how much I appreciate your seriousness in wanting to find truth. Part of what’s always attracted me to Catholicism is the Church’s long tradition of affirming both faith and reason. Since you’re interested in science, I think you’ll find these books and pamphlets especially intriguing [hands out material].
Conclusion
The teleological argument, as we’ve given it, offers a powerful evangelization tool, since it effectively diffuses the tension people often perceive between religion and science. Fine-tuning not only dissolves that tension, but shows the deep compatibility between modern science and the existence of God, while allowing people to avoid the often-cited evolution debate, which is often emotionally-charged. Evolution, after all, depends on a finely-tuned universe; a point which is worth emphasizing when talking to skeptics!
[1] The term “anthropic coincidences” is a take from the “anthropic principle” developed by the theoretical astrophysicist Brandon Carter in 1973. See also Dr. Stephen Barr, Anthropic Coincidences and the Multiverse Idea (Washington, DC: Washington Theological Consortium, 2013) <https://washtheocon.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Universe-Designed-for-Life.pdf>.
[2] Cf. Fr. Robert J. Spitzer, S.J., New Proofs for the Existence of God (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 58.
[3] Cf. Robin Collins, The Fine-Tuning of Discoverability (Greer-Heard Forum, 2014) <http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Greer-Heard%20Forum%20paper%20draft%20for%20posting.pdf>.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Sir Fred Hoyle, “The Universe: Past and Present Reflection,” Engineering and Science 45, no. 2 (November, 1981): 12.