Richard Dawkins once boldly announced that our universe, at bottom, is “pure, pitiless indifference,” possessed of no real good or evil, since everything (accordingly to his atheistic paradigm) is a haphazard assembly of fundamental particles, with no intention, direction, purpose, or aim.[1] Dawkins is not alone in his nihilistic assessment. Many atheists have recognized that without God our foundation for objective moral value is in complete collapse. But, this is clearly not how humanity perceives the world. The moral argument argues for the existence of God from the common perception and conviction that good and evil are real.
Humanity’s Moral Sense
Nearly every human—aside from those diagnosed as sociopathic—recognize that some actions are truly better than others; that some thoughts and deeds are, in fact, really good; and others, really wrong. To live like Mother Teresa is objectively better (or so we assume) than to live like Adolf Hitler. The question then becomes, is our moral sense reliable, or not?
As C.S. Lewis once put it: you can’t make sense of a crooked line without first understanding the concept of a straight one.[2] Similarly, without a perfect and transcendent source of “The Good,” it becomes incredibly difficult—if not outright impossible—to make sense of our moral language; of things being good or bad, right or wrong, better or worse. Because to what, ultimately, are we making these comparisons? What is that moral “straight line,” so to speak?
Morality’s Transcendent Reference-Point
Traditionally speaking, it was God’s essentially all-good and loving nature that provided the perfect, objective, and transcendent reference point for moral value, whereas God’s will (which reflects God’s nature) offered a foundation for moral obligation. Please don’t misunderstand: something is not good simply because God wills it, nor does God will something simply because it is good. Rather, God is goodness itself, and so whatever God wills is necessarily good, precisely because of who and what God is. The good, then, is neither arbitrary nor above God, but identical to God.
However, if atheism is true, then this foundation is lost, and all morality becomes relative to society and culture; specifically, a matter of preference and the conditioning of society. There is no longer any transcendent anchor-point to offer an objective moral assessment of human experience. No longer is anything truly good or bad, or right or wrong, but only a matter of opinion and taste. There are only acts of human will, but no way to distinguish them morally from what any one particular person—or society as a whole—happens to prefer.
If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It
The moral argument ultimately offers a clue, and then a choice. There seems to be no real reason to deny the general reliability of our moral experience—to affirm that some things, for example, like slavery and the holocaust, are objectively evil; and to affirm that other things, such as self-sacrifice and compassion, are objectively good. In fact, the only reason a person would deny their moral experience is because they are assuming atheism. But are the arguments for atheism really more obvious than our moral experience? Honestly, I don’t think so.
But to overcome a potential objection, more needs to be said. Some would try to turn to evolutionary science to find a basis for objective morality. But science, and specifically evolutionary science, does not—and cannot—decide the moral question; evolutionary science can’t tell us whether we evolved to discover our moral experience, or to invent it. Only a philosophy of God can.
Furthermore, many people who deny objective morality are convinced that evolution has equipped us with intelligence to discover real, clearly objective aspects of our universe. If that is true, then we should not arbitrarily deny that the same has occurred with respect to our moral experience. But the question of moral experience is in itself ultimately philosophical, and can only be answered by considering the existence of God. Does our moral experience match up to something “really and already good?” If we’re going to answer “yes,” then to be consistent, we need to believe in the existence of God.
To put it simply, one conception of the world—call it, the religious conception—provides a sound foundation to moral experience, given the perfect and essential nature of God. The other conception of the world—the atheistic conception—is incompatible with moral experience and leads inevitably to nihilism, as many famous atheists have recognized. As atheistic philosopher Alex Rosenberg starkly admits in his book An Atheist’s Guide to Reality, “No moral code is right, correct, true. That’s nihilism. And we have to accept it.”[3]
So, the question is this: In which world do you think we live?
The Problem of Evil & Suffering: Why Does an All-Good God Allow Bad Things to Happen?
There’s another topic related to the moral argument for God’s existence: the problem of evil and suffering. Let’s get right into it.
Here is a principle of philosophy and life: always interpret what is unclear by what is clear. In other words, begin with what is obvious, demonstrable, or very probably the case. Then, use that perspective to illuminate whatever is difficult or ambiguous.
We should do this when we consider the problem of suffering and evil. If God is all-powerful, the argument goes, then He can do anything. If God is all good, He would eliminate evil. But evil exists, so either God is not all-powerful or God is not all-good. Let’s look at this logic, beginning with what is clear.
The problem of evil contains a presumption: that God is not dealing with evil. From the Christian perspective, this presumption is inaccurate. Christians believe that God has been dealing with the problem of evil, and will complete what He has begun. He chose to deal with it primarily through the renewal of the human heart, where sin dwells. He does this by grace and His Word, prepared and announced by the prophets of the Old Testament, fulfilled in Jesus Christ, continued through the work of His Church, and completed at the end of time. Therefore, the problem of evil, as an argument, is not a good logical argument.
The real question is “Why would God choose to deal with the problem of evil in this way, as opposed to, say, obliterating evil immediately?” The answer to this question is very involved, theologically and philosophically, requiring a lot of unpacking. For our purposes, there are two aspects for consideration: 1) the nature of God and how we conceptualize Him, and 2) the design of creation.
The nature of God. Concerning the first aspect, we need to ask ourselves a question: Is God merely a “mighty smiter”—a powerful judge—or is He more than that? True, God punishes sin and evil, but to conceptualize Him only or fixedly in this way offers an incomplete picture of who God is and how He has chosen to act in salvation history. If we expect God to deal with evil immediately with decisiveness, so as to eradicate it from existence promptly, then we’ve come close to the “mighty smiter” view of God that most people (rightly) are skeptical of.
The design of creation. The second aspect, the design of creation, is multifaceted. One must consider the free will of humans as well as the purpose or function of creation. God established that mankind be free to choose Him in love and to strive for perfection. He created the world in such a way that we didn’t all come into existence with perfected natures. We were meant to practice the virtues and moral goods. The Fall of mankind complicated our striving for perfection, by giving us extra obstacles to overcome.
Let us put it another way. For creatures to be free, God cannot determine them to act a certain way. Furthermore, for significant moral goods to be possible, God may have to “make room” for significant moral freedom (the ability to choose wrong, and perhaps horribly so; holocaust type stuff, etc.).[4] God cannot create just any old “possible world,” but may be restricted in what He actualizes in view of his overall project. From that consideration alone, the problem of evil fails from a logical perspective. It claims that if God is all-powerful He would prevent evil. But if God’s project is to bring forth a good which requires the possibility of evil or brings good out of evil, then He could not use that power in ways contrary to His overall plan.[5]
All of this answers the challenge to the first premise of the “problem of evil”—God’s ability to “do anything.” But we can go further, since the second premise (an all-good God would eliminate evil) is equally suspect. Again, start from experience. Start from what is clear.
There are many situations in life where we tolerate some degree of suffering/evil because of a concomitant good that may not be possible without it. When my child complains that he is frustrated with practicing his musical instrument, I could remedy the issue by telling him to enjoy television instead. But instead, I see the challenge as valuable and encourage him to continue, even though it bothers me to witness his frustration. Even more, he (being a child) may not be able to see why this is good and may not realize that it is good until he (hopefully) becomes a better musician and develops virtues such as fortitude, patience, etc. This is a profoundly tame example, of course, but provides the philosophical perspective to challenge the second premise of the evil argument. Clearly, God could (and must) have morally sufficient reasons for allowing suffering/evil to occur, since God *is* all-good, as made clear from entirely independent, philosophical considerations.
If we already have reasons—and strong reasons at that—to believe that God exists and is all-good, then we can trust He must have morally sufficient reasons for whatever suffering and/or evil He permits. Whether or not we have a clue about what those reasons are, or could be, is a separate matter: Why should our ignorance surprise us? We are not omniscient; we don’t see how everything ultimately connects. So, it’s not just that we don’t happen to know, but also that we shouldn’t expect to know; any more than we’d expect a child to be able to see all possible future goods when being parented.
Something else that is also clear are the demonstrative philosophical arguments that conclude the existence of an eternal, timeless, spaceless, all-powerful, and wholly good God. We have looked at several of them so far in this lesson. These arguments start from first principles of reason and experience that cannot be coherently denied, and proceed deductively to their conclusion, rendering their deliverances certain. In other words, the philosophical arguments for God’s existence (including God’s goodness) provide a sound, intellectual foundation for how to perceive suffering and evil: not as a philosophy problem, but as a theological mystery. Indeed, only if we lacked such evidence and arguments for an all-good God, would the problem of suffering/evil be a serious objection to God’s existence. But in consideration of the arguments and evidence that we do have, and the clarity provided thereby, evil and suffering—much like the Trinity and transubstantiation—are better classified as a mystery (and possibly even opportunity) than as a powerful philosophical objection. But, that is not all.
Apart from the philosophical arguments, we also have the historical arguments for Christ and his bodily resurrection from the dead, along with scientific evidence of fine-tuning, the universe’s beginning, near death experiences, miracles, etc. All of which continues to add significant epistemic weight (and clarity) in favor of theism. Again—because this is worth reiterating—it would only be in the ABSENCE of the philosophical arguments, scientific evidence, and personal experiences of God that suffering would provide a substantial objection; but in light of, and in comparison to, such arguments and evidence, the reasonable conclusion is to look at suffering/evil through what is already clear. And God’s existence and goodness is clear.
In the end, the problem of evil argument is illogical and very myopic. While convenient for some people, the argument is not in keeping with both reality and experience. God will not obliterate evil immediately and thoroughly without regard for Himself or the design of His creation. He has been dealing with evil and suffering throughout all of salvation history, keeping in mind Himself as well as the design of His creation. Our task, then, is to see evil and suffering not as a philosophical problem to be solved, but as a theological mystery by which we can grow in moral goodness and virtue.
Example Dialogue
Here’s an example dialogue that brings together both the moral argument and the above response to “the problem of evil and suffering.”
Evangelist stands near a street corner with miraculous medals in hand. He smiles and says hello to passerby.
Evangelist [E]: Would you like a miraculous medal?
Passerby: [Passerby (P) stops and takes it] Sure. What is it?
E: In 1830, the Virgin Mary appeared to a nun in France, asking that this medal be struck. It’s a testament to the power of prayer and by wearing it, we can be reminded of that.
P: That sounds nice and all, but I can’t really see how prayer actually does anything. The world is a pretty messed up place regardless of prayer.
E: There certainly is a lot wrong with the world. Can I ask if you’re a Christian?
P: No, not at all. I don’t believe in God.
E: Would you say you’re an atheist then?
P: Yeah, I would. Like I said, the world’s got a lot of bad in it. How could a loving God make something like that?
E: That’s a question that’s troubled people for millennia. In fact, it troubled me personally for a long time. May I give you one good reason that I believe in God, despite all the evil in the world?
P: Sure, why not?
E: Well, I realized that God must have some morally sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering. I thought, ‘OK, this is a highly emotional subject, because everybody deals with suffering in life. But, putting emotion aside, what is the argument saying? Is it saying it’s impossible that an all-good God could have some morally sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering?’ Because if that’s the argument, I don’t see it as being a very good one, do you?
P: I’m not sure what you mean….
E: I’ll give you an example. One of our kids was recently exposed to chickenpox, so we rushed him to get the vaccine. He was terrified at the idea of having to get a shot and really couldn’t understand why we did this to him. From our perspective, we honestly believed—and still believe—that this was truly the right thing to do. So, we allowed him to suffer, even though we hated to see it, not because we don’t love our son, but because we do love him. So, if there’s any possible instance where some evil or suffering could be allowed because of some greater good to be gained later on, then how could I possibly assume that God—who is the all-powerful and all-knowing creator of the world—couldn’t also have similarly good reasons?
P: I don’t know, man. There’s a lot of suffering in this world—everything from the Holocaust to natural disasters—so what could those possible reasons be?
E: I don’t think anybody can say 100% for sure. We’re not omniscient (or all-knowing), and don’t see how everything eventually pans out. On that note though, because we’re not omniscient, can anybody prove that God (who is omniscient) doesn’t, or couldn’t, have good reasons for allowing bad things to happen, even to good people?
All that being said, there are some speculations on the matter. Many philosophers and theologians have argued that for certain good things to be possible—such as free will, or moral development—God may have only been able to bring such things about by creating a world where suffering and evil were a real possibility; where free creatures, for example, could choose hate instead of love.
P: I still don’t see why God couldn’t have made us perfect at the start and avoided all this trouble entirely.
E: Good observation. Have you considered that there’s something inherently good about developing morally, and having some control over the types of people we become?
P: What do you mean?
E: Well, have you seen the movie Man of Steel®️ from 2013?
P: Yes, I have—good movie!
E: Yeah, it was great! One of the reasons why I think it is good is because of the scenes where Jonathan Kent is trying to help Clark to understand his powers. There was one such scene where Clark is being bullied, but Clark restrains himself. Jonathan sees this restraint, and, after the bullies leave, asks Clark if he wanted to hurt the bullies. Clark says yes, and Jonathan tells him about character, namely what kind of man he wants to become, and that his abilities will be used for good or evil accordingly.
P: Yes, I recall that, but what does this have to do with God not making us perfect?
E: It means that perhaps certain moral goods, such as compassion, justice, and especially empathy, are greater when they can be embraced by free choice and through struggle. And perhaps God thought that creating a world in which his creatures have that kind of freedom was worth the risk of them choosing evil. I think that when we look at the good that can be attained through such struggle, it gives us reason to trust that God may, in fact, have good reasons for allowing things to be this way.
In other words, if we all came into existence as “perfect” beings, possessing all moral goods and attributes in their highest possible way, what is accomplished? There is something to be said for working for and striving after perfection. If it’s all just done for us from the get-go, where’s the meaning?
But, here’s another thing that struck me, which might be of help for you. When I spent more time thinking about the problem of evil, I saw that the problem points towards God’s existence, rather than away from it.
P: And how is that exactly?
E: Well, we assume that good and evil are real features of the world in which we live. But if God doesn’t exist, I don’t see how good and evil could be real features in the world. It seems we need some objective, transcendent standard of the good from which to base our moral assessments. And if everything that exists is just a happy, freak accident, then what is that moral standard supposed to be?
P: I would say that it’s just whatever’s best for society?
E: I don’t think I’d necessarily disagree with that statement, but it doesn’t seem to get at the deeper issue. First, what is best for society? Second, how do we know what is best? In concrete terms, Hitler, for example, thought that killing people in concentration camps was good for the Aryan race. Other societies, like the United States, opposed him, believing that the good involves democracy and freedom. Is it just a matter of preference then, or majority rule? Or is there some outside standard which can judge the issue?
P: What are you getting at, exactly?
E: Traditionally speaking, God has long been considered to be what Plato called “The Good.” God, therefore, provides the objective reference point for moral values through his essentially all-good nature, and God’s will (which reflects his nature) provides a sound foundation for moral obligation. Ironically, I don’t think we’d be concerned about evil unless we believed in an absolute moral law, but I also don’t think we can believe in an absolute moral law without an absolute moral law-giver.
P: That may be true, but I think life is about love and not laws. All you need is love.
E: I think most people would agree that love is the highest principle of life. But, love also requires freedom of the will, since without the ability to choose, we really can’t love. Without that element of freedom, we’re puppets, not lovers. Now, Christianity not only says that God wants love, but that God is love. This seems to square perfectly with experience. So, evil is still a problem, but it’s a problem with God in the picture, rather than out. Ultimately, evil isn’t so much a philosophical objection, as a theological mystery, and as Christians believe, an opportunity to increase in love and relationship with God. I get that probably doesn’t answer every question you have, but is it a helpful start?
P: [nods] It’s interesting for sure. I’ll have to think more about it.
E: I’ve got some materials here that might be a good springboard. Would you like to take them with you? [hands materials to P]
Conclusion
While the moral argument doesn’t offer the same argumentation force as, say, the contingency argument, it does tend to be more impactful in everyday conversation; perhaps, not only because the argument is less abstract, but also because it hits people right where they live. Everybody has a moral sense, and most people have strong moral opinions on world affairs. By affirming the reality and reliability of this moral sense—which almost every sincere person is eager to do—we are led ineluctably to the existence of God to support it.
[1] Cf. Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden (New York, New York: Basic Books, 1995), 96 and 133.
[2] Cf. C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), 38.
[3] See for example, Alex Rosenberg, An Atheist’s Guide to Reality (New York, New York, W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 2011), 113.
[4] This statement in itself is not intended to provide a theodicy. It is not intended to provide an account for every bad thing that’s ever happened by labelling the good that’s supposed to come from it. Why? Because no one is in such a privileged epistemic state to do so. We’re merely attempting to show that there is reason to believe that in God’s plan, sufficient good will come from the evil in the world. We’re not claiming to know what that good is and then to use it to “answer” the problem of evil. That’s not possible.
[5] The emotional problem of evil, on the other hand, is another thing entirely—and it may prevent some people from accepting that the problem of evil fails logically. But strictly speaking, it doesn’t matter how we feel. Logically, there is nothing preventing God from being all-good and all-powerful, but having sufficient reasons to allow suffering and evil.